Canada exported 4.2 million barrels per day of crude in 2024. 95.7% went to the U.S. The Trans Mountain Expansion — completed in 2024 at $34 billion — is Canada’s only scaled route to non-U.S. energy markets. Nearly every other pipeline runs north–south. CPTPP and CETA exist on paper but have not shifted the export share. Ten MOUs were signed in 2025; none are enforceable trade agreements. The diversification rhetoric is decades old. The infrastructure to support it is not.
Read the full analysis, sources, and counter-arguments ↓to U.S. (2024)
(only non-U.S. route)
(0 enforceable)
terminals operating
- Canada exported 4.2 million b/d of crude in 2024; 95.7% (approximately 4.0 million b/d) went to the United States. [CER]
- The Trans Mountain Expansion was completed in May 2024 at a cost of $34 billion (original estimate: $7.4 billion). It is Canada’s only scaled pipeline route to tidewater for non-U.S. export. [CER, TMC]
- Nearly every other major crude pipeline runs north–south: Keystone, Enbridge Mainline, Express. No east-coast crude export terminal operates at scale. [CER]
- No Canadian LNG export terminal is currently operational. LNG Canada (Kitimat, BC) is under construction with first cargo expected 2025–2026. [CER, NRCan]
- CPTPP was ratified in 2018. CETA (Canada-EU) provisionally applied since 2017. Neither has materially shifted Canada’s export share away from the U.S. [StatCan, GAC]
- In 2025, the Canadian government signed 10 MOUs with various countries. None are enforceable trade agreements. The two signed deals (Ukraine, Indonesia) were negotiated by the previous government. [The Receipts: 10 Handshakes]
- The U.S. share of Canadian goods exports has remained between approximately 73% and 77% over the past decade despite diversification rhetoric. [StatCan]
1. The Pipeline Geography
Canada’s pipeline network was built to move product south. Keystone runs from Hardisty, Alberta to the U.S. Gulf Coast. The Enbridge Mainline moves crude from Western Canada to refineries in Ontario and the U.S. Midwest. Express Pipeline runs south to Montana and Wyoming. Line 5, which crosses the Straits of Mackinac, supplies refineries in Sarnia, Ontario and the U.S. Midwest.
The Trans Mountain Expansion, completed in May 2024, is the single exception at scale. It triples the capacity of the original Trans Mountain pipeline to approximately 890,000 barrels per day, terminating at Westridge Marine Terminal in Burnaby, BC — providing tanker access to Asian and other Pacific markets. The project cost $34 billion, more than four times the original $7.4 billion estimate. The federal government purchased it in 2018 after Kinder Morgan threatened to abandon the project amid regulatory and legal opposition.
TMX is a significant achievement in infrastructure terms. It is also a single route. If it experienced an outage or capacity constraint, Canada would have no other scaled non-U.S. energy export pathway. The east coast has no crude export terminal operating at scale. The Energy East pipeline, which would have connected Alberta crude to the Atlantic coast, was cancelled in 2017.
2. The LNG Gap
Canada is one of the world’s largest natural gas producers. It has zero operating LNG export terminals. Australia, which began building LNG capacity over a decade ago, is now one of the world’s top three LNG exporters. Qatar and the United States are the others.
LNG Canada in Kitimat, BC is under construction and expected to ship its first cargo in 2025–2026. It will be Canada’s first operational LNG export facility. Woodfibre LNG in Squamish, BC is also under development. On the east coast, multiple proposed projects have stalled or been cancelled over the past decade.
The LNG gap matters for trade dependency because natural gas is one of the few Canadian energy exports that could access non-U.S. markets at scale — if the infrastructure existed. Without it, gas exports follow the same north–south pattern as crude: pipeline-bound to the U.S. market.
3. The Agreement Gap
Canada has trade agreements beyond CUSMA. CPTPP provides preferential access to Japan, Australia, Vietnam, Malaysia, and other Pacific markets. CETA provides access to the EU. Both are real agreements with enforceable provisions.
Neither has materially shifted Canada’s trade pattern. The U.S. share of Canadian goods exports has remained between approximately 73% and 77% over the past decade. The structural reasons are geography (proximity reduces transport costs), integration (supply chains built over decades around cross-border flows), and market size (the U.S. economy is roughly 13 times larger than Canada’s).
The 2025 MOU campaign — documented in The Receipts’ 10 Handshakes, Zero Signatures — produced 10 memoranda of understanding with various countries. None are enforceable trade agreements. MOUs express intent; they do not create binding market access, tariff preferences, or dispute resolution mechanisms. The two agreements that were signed (Ukraine, Indonesia) were negotiated by the previous government.
This does not mean diversification is impossible. It means the infrastructure and agreements that would be required to redirect trade at scale do not currently exist — and building them takes years to decades, not months.
4. The Non-Energy Constraint
The dependency documented in Part 1 extends well beyond energy. Auto parts cross the Canada-U.S. border an average of eight times during assembly. Aerospace supply chains are deeply integrated. Agricultural products face complex market-specific certification, quota, and tariff structures that cannot be redirected quickly.
For manufacturing sectors, the constraint is not pipelines but supply chain architecture. A Canadian auto parts manufacturer supplies plants in Michigan and Ohio. Redirecting that production to a plant in Germany or Japan would require new logistics, new quality certifications, new just-in-time delivery networks, and fundamentally different economics of transport. The integration took decades to build. It cannot be replicated on a political timeline.
The Scotiabank trade analysis shows that energy dominates the Canada-U.S. export relationship in value terms, but manufactured goods, metals, and agricultural products create the deepest integration in terms of cross-border dependence. Losing preferential access affects not just the price of exports but the viability of the production systems that generate them.
Trade diversification may be happening in ways that aggregate statistics do not capture. Services trade, digital exports, and intellectual property flows are growing and are less dependent on physical infrastructure. Canada’s tech sector, financial services, and professional services exports are less U.S.-concentrated than goods exports.
TMX and LNG Canada, once operational together, would represent a meaningful structural change in Canada’s energy export geography — the first time Canada has had scaled tidewater access for both crude and natural gas simultaneously. The infrastructure gap may be closing, albeit slowly.
CPTPP and CETA may also take longer to produce visible trade shifts than the timeline measured here. New trade agreements typically take 5–10 years to produce significant trade creation effects as businesses adjust supply chains and develop new market relationships.
The structural picture across all three parts is consistent: Canada built an economy on the assumption that preferential U.S. market access is permanent. That assumption is now being tested by a rules architecture (the CUSMA sunset clause) that makes access subject to periodic reconfirmation. The infrastructure to support alternatives — one operational tidewater pipeline, zero operating LNG terminals, MOUs rather than enforceable agreements — does not match the scale of the dependency.
This is not an argument that Canada should have done something different. It is a documentation of what Canada built, what it depends on, and what it has available if the assumption of permanent access proves wrong. The gap between the diversification rhetoric and the infrastructure reality is measurable.
Counter-interpretation: The U.S. also depends on Canadian energy, metals, and integrated supply chains. Mutual dependence creates mutual incentive to maintain access. The structural dependency may be stable precisely because it is mutual — the U.S. needs Canadian crude, potash, uranium, and hydro as much as Canada needs the U.S. market. A rational assessment of mutual interest may be more protective than diversification infrastructure.
- If the U.S. share of Canadian goods exports declines below 65% within five years of CPTPP and CETA implementation, diversification would be working at a pace this analysis does not anticipate.
- If LNG Canada reaches full operational capacity and a second terminal begins construction, the energy export geography would be structurally different from what this analysis describes.
- If the July 2026 CUSMA review results in a smooth extension, the urgency of diversification would be diminished — the dependency would remain but the rules stability would be reconfirmed.
- If Canadian manufacturers successfully redirect significant supply chain relationships to non-U.S. markets (measurable in StatCan trade data), the integration constraint would be less binding than this analysis suggests.
- Canada Energy Regulator — Crude oil export data (2024), pipeline infrastructure reports
- Trans Mountain Corporation — Expansion project completion and cost data
- Statistics Canada — International trade in goods, U.S. export share (2015–2025)
- Global Affairs Canada — CPTPP implementation, CETA provisional application
- Natural Resources Canada — LNG Canada project status, energy export infrastructure
- Scotiabank Economics — Canada-U.S. trade statistics and sector breakdown (January 2025)
- Government of Canada — Trade diversification strategy documents
- The Receipts — “10 Handshakes, Zero Signatures” (MOU vs. agreement analysis)
- The Receipts — “LNG: The 16,000-Mile Receipt” (LNG export gap)
- IMF — World Economic Outlook Database (GDP comparisons)
- Texas Comptroller — Texas Economic Snapshot (state GDP data)
Do you have access to CER pipeline capacity data, LNG project timelines, CPTPP or CETA trade creation studies, or industry supply chain redirection assessments? We welcome corrections, additional context, and contrary evidence. Contact: tips@thereceipts.ca