Since taking office, the Carney government has announced trade agreements with multiple foreign governments. A strict count of official releases shows a consistent pattern: the enforceable treaty-level deals were negotiated by the previous government. The government has not yet launched and signed an enforceable trade agreement of its own. MOUs signal intent. They do not change the rules.
Read the full analysis, sources, and counter-arguments ↓Since taking office on April 28, 2025, the Carney government has announced trade-related agreements with Indonesia, the United Arab Emirates, China, Qatar, and South Korea. The announcements have been presented as evidence of a trade diversification strategy — pivoting Canadian economic relationships away from dependence on the United States.
A strict count of these agreements, based on official government releases, reveals a pattern worth examining: the government has signed two enforceable treaty-level deals (both negotiated by the previous government) and ten non-binding memoranda of understanding. It has not yet launched and signed an enforceable trade agreement of its own.
Qatar (2): Economic cooperation, IT
UAE (1): AI / emerging tech
Korea (1): Future mobility
Indonesia (1): Military cooperation
What is an MOU — and what isn't it
A memorandum of understanding is a non-binding cooperation framework. It signals intent, establishes working relationships, and can set the agenda for future negotiations. It does not create enforceable legal obligations, reduce tariffs, guarantee market access, or provide dispute resolution mechanisms. An MOU cannot be enforced in any court or tribunal.
An enforceable trade agreement — such as a Free Trade Agreement (FTA), Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA), or Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement (FIPA) — is a legally binding treaty. It creates obligations that can be enforced through international dispute settlement. It requires ratification. It changes the rules.
The distinction matters because the government's public communications do not always make it clear. PMO releases announce MOUs alongside enforceable agreements in the same news cycles, under headlines about "securing new agreements" and "forging partnerships." A reader encountering these announcements would need to read carefully to distinguish binding commitments from non-binding frameworks.
The two signed deals
The Carney government has signed two enforceable trade instruments: the Canada–Indonesia CEPA (September 24, 2025) and the Canada–UAE FIPA (November 2025). Both are significant. Neither was initiated by the Carney government.
The Indonesia CEPA negotiations were launched on June 20, 2021 — nearly four years before Carney took office. Negotiations were substantively concluded on November 15, 2024, and trade ministers signed a joint statement concluding talks on December 2, 2024 — five months before Carney's election. The Carney government's contribution was the formal signing ceremony and the legislative process to bring the agreement into force.
The UAE FIPA negotiations were launched in 2016 — nine years before the signing. The Global Affairs Canada background page confirms the long negotiation timeline. The Carney government signed the agreement during a visit in November 2025.
Signing a negotiated agreement is a legitimate and necessary government function. But presenting these as achievements of the current government's trade diversification strategy, without noting that negotiations were launched and concluded under previous governments, creates an attribution gap.
Historical baseline: how fast do trade deals happen?
No Canadian government has ever launched and signed an enforceable trade agreement in its first ten months. The historical record makes the timeline clear.
CETA — Canada's landmark deal with the European Union — took seven years from launch to signature (May 2009 to October 2016), spanning the Harper and Trudeau governments. The CPTPP took a decade from initial Trans-Pacific Partnership negotiations to entry into force. The Canada–Korea FTA took nine years. Even the Canada–Ukraine FTA modernization, a relatively narrow upgrade of an existing agreement, took over two years from launch to conclusion.
This context does not excuse the presentation gap — if the government implies its MOUs are equivalent to enforceable deals, that is a transparency problem regardless of timeline constraints. But it does mean that the "zero enforceable deals" figure, cited without historical context, can be weaponized to imply failure where the real issue is pace, not direction.
The pipeline: what's actually been initiated
The cold count of "zero enforceable deals launched and signed" is accurate under the strict definition. But it omits something important: the Carney government has initiated new enforceable trade negotiations that are now in progress.
At APEC in October 2025, the PM and Thai Prime Minister Charnvirakul announced the launch of free trade negotiations between Canada and Thailand — Canada's second-largest trading partner in Southeast Asia. This is a new negotiation initiated under the current government.
In October 2025, the PM and Philippine President Marcos announced their intention to launch bilateral FTA negotiations, with a target of concluding in 2026. On November 5, 2025, the government tabled a formal Notice of Intent to enter free trade negotiations with the Philippines. The first round of negotiations took place in Manila in February 2026.
Additionally, the government accelerated the existing Canada–ASEAN FTA negotiations, committing $25 million in technical assistance and targeting conclusion during the Philippines' ASEAN chairmanship in 2026.
None of these have produced signed, enforceable agreements — that is the nature of trade negotiations. But the claim that the government has done nothing beyond MOUs omits an active and documented pipeline. Whether that pipeline produces results is the question that will answer itself over the next 12–24 months.
- The Canada–Indonesia CEPA was signed on September 24, 2025. Negotiations were launched on June 20, 2021 and substantively concluded on November 15, 2024 — both before the Carney government took office. (PMO release, Sep 24, 2025; Global Affairs Canada background page; Global Affairs Canada launch announcement, Jun 20, 2021.)
- The Canada–UAE FIPA was signed during a PM visit in November 2025. Negotiations were launched in 2016. (Global Affairs Canada background page.)
- The Carney government has secured ten memoranda of understanding: five with China (energy, crime, cultural exchanges, wood products, food safety), two with Qatar (economic cooperation, IT), one with the UAE (AI/emerging tech), one with South Korea (future mobility), and one with Indonesia (military cooperation). All are explicitly labeled "MOU" in official releases. (PMO releases: Jan 16, 2026; Jan 18, 2026; Nov 21, 2025; Feb 5, 2026; DND, Aug 2025.)
- MOUs are non-binding cooperation frameworks. They do not create enforceable legal obligations, reduce tariffs, or provide dispute resolution mechanisms. (Standard international law definition; Global Affairs Canada treaty classification.)
- CETA negotiations took seven years from launch to signature (May 2009 to October 2016). The CPTPP process took approximately a decade. The Canada–Korea FTA took nine years (2005–2014). No Canadian government has launched and signed an enforceable trade agreement within its first year. (Global Affairs Canada; CETA chronology; CPTPP timeline.)
- In October 2025, the PM and Thai Prime Minister Charnvirakul announced the launch of free trade negotiations between Canada and Thailand. (PMO release, Nov 1, 2025.)
- On November 5, 2025, the government tabled a Notice of Intent to enter free trade negotiations with the Philippines. The first round of negotiations took place in Manila in February 2026. (Global Affairs Canada, Philippines FTA background page; Philippine News Agency, Feb 2026.)
- The government committed $25 million in technical assistance to accelerate Canada–ASEAN FTA negotiations, with a target of concluding during the Philippines' 2026 ASEAN chairmanship. (PMO release, Oct 27, 2025.)
Critics who cite "zero enforceable deals" may omit the historical baseline: no Canadian government has ever launched and signed a trade agreement in its first ten months. Trade deals take years, sometimes a decade. The Carney government is ten months old. Citing "zero" without this context implies a failure where the historical norm would produce the same number. The government did sign two enforceable agreements — the Indonesia CEPA and the UAE FIPA — even though it did not negotiate them. Signing and implementing negotiated deals is a legitimate government function, and the Indonesia CEPA in particular represents Canada's first comprehensive trade agreement in the Indo-Pacific. Critics may also omit that MOUs, while non-binding, can serve as genuine precursors to enforceable agreements and are a standard diplomatic tool used by every Canadian government.
Supporters who cite the MOU count as evidence of trade diversification may omit that MOUs are non-binding by design — they create no enforceable market access, no tariff reductions, and no investment protections. Presenting ten MOUs alongside two signed treaties, without clearly distinguishing between binding and non-binding instruments, creates an impression of deal-making momentum that the legal status of the instruments does not support. The two enforceable deals were negotiated over years by the previous government; claiming them as evidence of a new trade strategy overstates the current government's contribution. And five of the ten MOUs were signed with China — a relationship where Canada's leverage, human rights concerns, and security considerations add significant complexity that non-binding frameworks do not address.
The government's trade record to date is ten non-binding frameworks and two inherited agreements. That is not unusual for a government ten months into its mandate — trade agreements take years. But the way the record is being presented matters. When PMO releases announce MOUs and enforceable agreements in the same cadence, under similar "new partnership" framing, without clearly distinguishing binding from non-binding instruments, they create a presentation gap. Readers are left to parse the difference themselves. A government that is serious about transparency on trade diversification would distinguish clearly between inherited agreements, new MOUs, and new enforceable negotiations launched under its own mandate.
The real test will come in the next 12–24 months. If the MOUs with China, Qatar, the UAE, and Korea lead to enforceable agreement negotiations — with published mandates, timelines, and accountability mechanisms — the current count becomes a reasonable first step. If they remain non-binding frameworks indefinitely, the "10 handshakes" framing hardens.
Counter-interpretation: Trade diversification is a multi-year strategy, not a 10-month deliverable. The Carney government inherited a trade file shaped by decades of US dependence and is operating under active US tariff pressure — exactly the conditions that require rapid relationship-building with alternative partners. MOUs are the standard first step in that process. Every major Canadian trade agreement began with non-binding frameworks, joint studies, and ministerial meetings before formal negotiations launched. Criticizing MOUs for being non-binding is like criticizing blueprints for not being buildings — the function is different. The Indonesia CEPA, regardless of who negotiated it, is the first comprehensive deal in the Indo-Pacific and the current government chose to prioritize signing it. The metric that matters is not how many deals were signed in month ten, but whether the pipeline of negotiations is expanding.
- If the government launches formal enforceable trade negotiations (FTA, CEPA, or FIPA) with any partner under a published mandate initiated after April 28, 2025, the "zero new enforceable deals initiated" characterization would need revision to reflect the pipeline.
- If any of the ten MOUs lead to enforceable agreements within a reasonable timeline (2–4 years), the characterization of MOUs as "only handshakes" would weaken — they would have functioned as intended precursors.
- If the government publishes a transparent trade diversification scorecard that clearly distinguishes between MOUs, inherited agreements, and newly initiated negotiations, the presentation gap described here would narrow.
- If comparable ten-month periods under previous governments show a similar or lower count of enforceable deal initiations, the implicit comparison would need to be adjusted.
Primary Sources
- PMO — Canada–Indonesia CEPA announcement (Sep 24, 2025)
- Global Affairs Canada — Indonesia CEPA negotiations launch (Jun 20, 2021)
- Global Affairs Canada — Indonesia CEPA background (negotiations concluded Nov 15, 2024)
- Global Affairs Canada — Canada–UAE FIPA background (negotiations launched 2016)
- PMO — China MOUs (Jan 16, 2026)
- PMO — Qatar MOUs (Jan 18, 2026)
- PMO — UAE AI/tech MOU (Nov 21, 2025)
- PMO — Korea future mobility MOU (Feb 5, 2026)
- DND — Indonesia military cooperation MOU (Aug 2025)
- Global Affairs Canada — CETA chronology (negotiations May 2009 – signature Oct 2016)
- PMO — Indo-Pacific partnerships announcement (Nov 1, 2025) — Thailand FTA launch, ASEAN acceleration
- PMO — Philippines FTA intention announcement (Oct 26, 2025)
- Global Affairs Canada — Canada–Philippines FTA background (Notice of Intent, Nov 5, 2025)
- PMO — ASEAN Summit outcomes (Oct 27, 2025) — $25M technical assistance, ASEAN FTA acceleration
Do you have documentation of enforceable trade negotiations formally launched (not MOUs) by the Carney government since April 28, 2025 — with published mandates and counterparty confirmation? We welcome corrections, additional context, and contrary evidence. Contact: tips@thereceipts.ca