The Receipt

On June 16, 2025, Prime Minister Mark Carney and U.S. President Donald Trump met at the G7 summit in Kananaskis, Alberta. The Prime Minister’s Office issued a readout: the two leaders had “agreed to pursue negotiations toward a deal within the coming 30 days.” [1] Carney posted the same commitment on X. It was the first time either side had set a definitive deadline for a trade agreement. [2]

That deadline passed. Thirteen months later, no comprehensive Canada-U.S. trade agreement has been reached. What the record shows is four policy concessions: Canada rescinded its digital services tax, dropped its retaliatory tariffs more broadly than publicly announced, moved to eliminate streaming content charges, and agreed to split toll revenue on a bridge it paid for entirely. The Prime Minister also publicly ruled out using energy exports as a bargaining chip. [7] [10] [12] [24]

In two cases, Canada received documented procedural commitments: a U.S. agreement to resume negotiations after the DST removal, and a mutual undertaking to open the Gordie Howe bridge. [7] [12] None produced a documented reciprocal reduction in the U.S. sectoral tariffs Canada has been seeking to remove. Steel and aluminum remain at 50 per cent. Autos remain at 25 per cent. On July 29, 2026, the Prime Minister said he would only accept a deal “if an agreement is possible.” [12]

Mark Carney entered the 2025 federal election with a central pitch: he was the person best equipped to negotiate with Donald Trump. He had run central banks, he understood leverage, and he would meet Trump in person “within days” of taking office to launch negotiations on a new trade and security agreement. [3] On April 28, the Liberals won 169 seats in an election reshaped by tariff threats and annexation rhetoric. Carney met Trump at the White House on May 6. [4] The Mandate, published during the campaign, measured the government’s platform commitments against the structural capacity to deliver them. [19] What follows is the record of what happened to the commitment at the centre of the campaign.

The 30-Day Timetable

Six weeks after taking office, Carney escalated from general intent to specific commitment. At the G7 summit in Kananaskis on June 16, 2025, he and Trump met for 70 minutes, including a 30-minute private session. [5] The PMO readout stated the leaders had “agreed to pursue negotiations toward a deal within the coming 30 days.” [1] Carney repeated the language on X. Trump told reporters a deal was achievable. [2]

The next day, Carney said the parties would “intensify” negotiations and that ministers and officials would remain in contact to “deliver on that timeline.” [2] It was, as CBC reported, the first time either side had put a definitive deadline on reaching a deal. [2] Thirty days from June 16 was approximately July 16, 2025.

Eleven Days

The 30-day clock lasted eleven days. On June 27, 2025, Trump announced on Truth Social that the United States was “terminating ALL discussions on Trade with Canada, effective immediately.” [6] The trigger was Canada’s digital services tax on U.S. technology companies, which Trump called “a direct and blatant attack on our Country.” [6]

Canada rescinded the tax two days later. The Department of Finance announced the DST would be rescinded “in anticipation of a mutually beneficial comprehensive trade arrangement with the United States.” The same release stated that “Prime Minister Carney and President Trump have agreed that parties will resume negotiations with a view towards agreeing on a deal by July 21, 2025.” [7] That July 21 deadline also passed without a deal. By late July, Carney was telling reporters Canada would “not accept a bad deal” and that the objective was “not to reach a deal whatever it costs.” [13]

The Four Concessions

Between June 2025 and July 2026, Canada changed four policies sought by the United States. Each came with a stated rationale. None produced a documented reciprocal reduction in the U.S. sectoral tariffs Canada has been seeking to remove.

1. The digital services tax (June 29, 2025). Canada rescinded the DST two days after Trump terminated talks over it. [6] [7] In return, Washington agreed to resume negotiations toward a July 21 agreement. [7] That is a documented procedural commitment. It did not produce tariff relief, and the July 21 deadline it set was also missed.

2. Retaliatory tariffs (August 22, 2025). Carney announced Canada would remove its 25 per cent counter-tariffs on CUSMA-compliant U.S. goods, effective September 1, framing it as preserving Canada’s “unique advantage” in the relationship. [9] A month later, CBC reported that the government’s own order-in-council showed all retaliatory tariffs had been removed except those on steel, aluminum, and autos, broader than what the Prime Minister had described publicly. [10] [11] Canada said the removal reflected “recognition” that most CUSMA-compliant Canadian goods could enter the U.S. tariff-free. [9] No new reciprocal U.S. tariff reduction followed.

3. Streaming content charges (July 2026). The government moved to eliminate the CRTC’s base contribution requirement on streaming services. A government court filing, revealed July 29, stated the intention to “eliminate the base contribution requirement on streaming services” and replace the funding from public revenue. [24] The charge had been repeatedly cited by U.S. officials as a major irritant in trade talks. [12] It was also the subject of ongoing domestic litigation by streaming companies, and the CRTC was already redesigning its broadcasting contribution framework. The U.S. irritant followed by Canadian reversal is documented; sole causation is not established.

4. Gordie Howe bridge toll revenue (July 29, 2026). Carney confirmed Canada would split toll revenue from the Gordie Howe International Bridge with the United States for the first 15 fiscal years, despite having paid the full cost of the bridge. [12] In return, both parties undertook the steps necessary to open the crossing. [12] That is a documented reciprocal commitment tied to a specific operational outcome. But the economic concession is real: Canada surrendered part of the return contemplated under the original financing structure.

The strongest defence of this pattern is pragmatism. Each policy change can be defended as a rational response to circumstances. The DST was a known irritant that other countries also faced pressure to withdraw. The counter-tariffs were hurting Canadian businesses that depended on U.S. inputs. The streaming charge was real money for households. The bridge needed to open. And Carney has noted that no country has managed to secure a comprehensive tariff-free agreement with the current U.S. administration, which has imposed tariffs and extracted concessions from virtually every major trading partner. [13]

The U.S. Trade Representative has responded to this pattern on the record. Speaking at the Aspen Security Forum on July 16, 2026, Jamieson Greer said he was glad Canada dropped the DST and rolled back the streaming charges, but that Canada does not “really get credit for doing something bad and then undoing it.” He called it “just good practice on their part.” [20]

The question the pragmatism defence does not address is outcome. After each concession, the core U.S. sectoral tariffs remained in place. The leverage available for the next round was smaller than the round before.

The Energy Signal

On July 29, 2026, in response to a reporter’s question about using energy as leverage, Carney said “I don’t see the value” in restricting Canada’s energy supply to the U.S. “Being a reliable supplier is important. Canadians are reliable. Canadians can be trusted,” he said. [12]

This is not equivalent to the four policy concessions. No Canadian energy restriction was in force and then surrendered. But it is a public narrowing of Canada’s stated bargaining position, made without a documented gain attached to it. Oil and gas are the sector where U.S. dependency on Canadian supply is most acute. Canadian energy exports have been subject to a 10 per cent U.S. tariff since March 2025 [17], but the rate is lower than on other sectors, reflecting that dependency.

In October 2025, U.S. Ambassador Pete Hoekstra said Carney had proposed doubling Canadian oil exports to the United States during his White House meeting, pitching an additional three to four million barrels per day as part of a prospective trade deal. [16] The PMO has not confirmed this account. Nine months later, the Prime Minister publicly stated he did not see value in using the same commodity as leverage.

Where the Timetable Stands

The 30-day timetable set at Kananaskis passed. The July 21 deadline set in the DST announcement passed. Trump terminated talks a second time in October 2025, over an Ontario-sponsored television ad featuring Ronald Reagan criticizing tariffs. [8] By December, Trump would say only “we’ll see” about whether to restart negotiations. [14]

In July 2026, Trump threatened a new round of 50 per cent tariffs on roughly US$20 billion in Canadian goods, set to take effect August 19. Unlike previous tariff rounds, these carry no carve-out for CUSMA-compliant goods: products that qualify under the trade agreement would face the full tariff. [15] [29] The core sectoral tariffs remain in place: 50 per cent on steel and aluminum, 25 per cent on autos, 10 per cent on lumber, 10 per cent on energy and potash, with a separate general duty on non-CUSMA goods. [17] [25] The day before Carney’s Red Deer appearance, Trump told Fox News he had no interest in preserving CUSMA. “I don’t care,” he said. “I’d rather be independent.” [30]

The negotiating architecture itself has shifted. On July 1, 2026, the United States formally declined to extend CUSMA at the agreement’s first mandatory review, triggering annual reviews and leaving the deal subject to expiration in 2036. [26] [18] Both Canada and Mexico had indicated their intention to renew. The U.S. said no. [26] Washington has opted to negotiate bilaterally rather than trilaterally, starting with Mexico. [27] Mexico is now in its third round of formal bilateral USMCA talks with the United States, covering autos, steel, agriculture, and labour, though that round ended without resolution amid disagreements over automotive content rules. [21] Canada has not begun equivalent formal bilateral negotiating rounds. [22]

Canada’s own trade minister has acknowledged the shift. Intergovernmental Affairs Minister Dominic LeBlanc said bilateral arrangements are now his working assumption. [27] That is a different structure from the comprehensive deal contemplated in 30 days at Kananaskis. What is emerging is sector-by-sector bilateral negotiation, Mexico first, Canada not yet started, inside a CUSMA framework the U.S. has declined to extend. The non-extension itself creates permanent leverage: as Bloomberg Economics noted, it gives the U.S. an implicit threat of roughly doubling tariffs on Canada and Mexico at every annual review. [28]

The cost of this uncertainty is documented. A Statistics Canada survey conducted with the Canadian Chamber of Commerce found that 10 per cent of Canadian manufacturing firms plan to delay major investments over the next 12 months in response to tariffs. [23] The trade war sent the economy into a mild contraction straddling 2025 and 2026. [23] The Bank of Canada’s July 2026 outlook estimates the average U.S. tariff rate on Canadian imports at 5.0 per cent and describes trade uncertainty as continuing to weigh on exports and business investment. [25]

Through it all, Canada has changed four policies sought by Washington. None removed the core sectoral tariffs. And on July 29, 2026, one day after Trump said he did not care about preserving the continental trade agreement, the Prime Minister said he would only accept a deal “if an agreement is possible.” [12] [30] That language could be read as a negotiating signal: a walkaway position intended to create pressure. It could also be read as a response to a president who publicly said the day before that he does not want a deal. Both readings point to the same distance: between “agreed to pursue negotiations toward a deal within the coming 30 days” and where Canada stands thirteen months later.

What Would Change This Assessment

Three conditions would materially alter this analysis:

  • A comprehensive trade agreement is reached that eliminates or substantially reduces the core U.S. sectoral tariffs on Canadian goods, demonstrating that the concession pattern produced a net gain.
  • Evidence emerges that any of the four concessions carried a reciprocal U.S. commitment beyond what has been made public, producing tariff relief not yet disclosed.
  • Canada enters formal bilateral USMCA negotiating rounds equivalent to those Mexico has completed, closing the procedural gap documented here.