I. The Promise

The Liberal Party's 2015 platform was explicit. The party promised to make government information "open by default," eliminate all Access to Information fees beyond the initial $5 filing charge, give the Information Commissioner the power to order the release of records, and — most significantly — extend the Access to Information Act to the Prime Minister's Office and ministers' offices. [1]

On November 4, 2015, days after winning a majority government, Justin Trudeau wrote an open letter to Canadians: "We committed to set a higher bar for openness and transparency in Ottawa. Government and its information must be open by default. Simply put, it is time to shine more light on government to make sure it remains focused on the people it was created to serve — you." [2]

These were not aspirational generalities. They were specific, measurable commitments: extend the Act to the PMO, give the Commissioner order-making power, eliminate fees, review every five years. The platform explicitly contrasted the Liberal approach with the Harper government's record on openness. [1]

What followed was a decade in which the system that was supposed to be reformed instead measurably deteriorated in timeliness — by the government's own metrics — while the promised structural changes either arrived in diluted form or never arrived at all.

II. The Reform That Fell Short

Bill C-58, introduced in 2017 and enacted in 2019, was the government's legislative response. It delivered some of what was promised: the Information Commissioner received order-making power, most ATI fees were eliminated, proactive publication obligations were added for ministers' offices and the PMO, and the Act was set for mandatory review every five years. [3]

But on the central promise — extending the Access to Information Act to the Prime Minister's Office and ministers' offices — the government substituted something different. Rather than giving Canadians the right to file access requests for PMO and ministerial records under Part 1 of the Act, the government created proactive publication obligations under Part 2. [3]

The distinction matters. Under a Part 1 right of access, the requester decides what to ask for. Under Part 2 proactive disclosure, the government decides what to publish. The Information Commissioner described the difference precisely in her special report to Parliament: the bill "does not" ensure the Act applies to the PMO and ministers' offices as promised. [4]

Commissioner Suzanne Legault's full assessment, delivered in September 2017, was unsparing. Her special report, titled "Failing to Strike the Right Balance for Transparency," concluded that Bill C-58 "fails to deliver on the government's promises" and that "rather than advancing access to information rights, Bill C-58 would instead result in a regression of existing rights." She noted that the bill "imposes added obligations on requesters," "adds new grounds for institutions to decline to act," and "reintroduces the possibility of various fees." [4]

In her final week in office in February 2018, Legault was more direct in an interview with the Globe and Mail. She called Bill C-58 "a bill for the bureaucracy" and said "the government is sliding into more secrecy and actually not delivering on its promise." She noted that "champions for transparency are absent." [10]

This assessment came from the independent Officer of Parliament charged with overseeing the access system — not from an opposition party or advocacy group.

III. The Numbers

The system's measurable performance tells a parallel story. Treasury Board publishes annual statistics on ATI response timeliness. The most consistent trend series — which excludes Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada to avoid volume distortions that make year-over-year comparison unreliable — shows a clear trajectory. [7]

In 2015–16, 81.9% of ATI requests were responded to within legislated timelines. By 2024–25, that figure had fallen to 64.5% — the lowest point in the series. [7]

The decline was not linear. Performance dropped sharply during the pandemic (65.1% in 2020–21), partially recovered, and then fell to a new low. But the endpoint is what matters for the promise-to-outcome comparison: a decade after the transparency commitment, the system was performing measurably worse than when the government took office.

A natural counter-argument is volume pressure — more requests straining the same capacity. The data complicates that defence. In 2024–25, request volume in the IRCC-excluded series was approximately 33,900 — roughly equal to the 33,700 requests filed in 2015–16. The worst performance year in the series coincided with a volume that was no higher than the baseline year. [7]

This does not prove that volume was irrelevant in intervening years — it clearly contributed during peak periods like 2022–23, when volume reached 52,377. But it does mean that the system in 2024–25 was performing significantly worse than it did a decade earlier under comparable demand. In our assessment, this suggests a structural deterioration beyond what volume alone can explain.

IV. The Pattern: Four Episodes of Document Resistance

The ATI statistics describe a system that got slower. The document-refusal episodes describe something more specific: a government that, when confronted with parliamentary demands for records related to scandals, chose resistance over disclosure — using cabinet confidence, unauthorized redaction, prorogation, court challenges, and outright refusal.

This article does not allege that every refusal was unjustified. In several cases, the government offered legal arguments — Charter concerns, national security, cabinet confidentiality — that were at minimum debatable. What the record shows is a recurring institutional preference for non-disclosure when the political stakes were highest.

Episode 1: SNC-Lavalin (2019)

When the SNC-Lavalin affair raised questions about whether the Prime Minister's Office pressured the Attorney General, the government issued a partial waiver of cabinet confidence to allow Jody Wilson-Raybould to testify before a parliamentary committee. But the waiver excluded her communications with the Director of Public Prosecutions. [11]

The RCMP later sought to expand the waiver to access additional materials and witnesses. The request was denied. The Clerk of the Privy Council did not provide the expanded waiver, and Trudeau did not override him. The RCMP Commissioner later told a parliamentary committee that the lack of access to cabinet confidences made the investigation "challenging." [12]

Liberal members of the Justice Committee then used their majority to end further investigation, passing a motion to close the probe. [11]

Episode 2: WE Charity (2020)

When the House Finance Committee ordered the release of documents related to the WE Charity grants program, thousands of pages were released — but the redactions had been performed by government bureaucrats, not by the parliamentary law clerk as the committee had specified. The Commons law clerk, Philippe Dufresne, warned that relevant information may have been withheld and that the committee's production order may have been violated. [13]

On August 18, 2020 — the same day the heavily redacted documents were released — Prime Minister Trudeau prorogued Parliament. Prorogation dissolved all sitting committees investigating the WE matter, leaving them unable to challenge the redactions or demand unredacted documents. [14]

Trudeau had pledged during the 2015 campaign not to use prorogation to avoid scrutiny — a commitment he made after attending a 2010 anti-prorogation rally criticizing the Harper government for the same practice. [14]

Episode 3: Winnipeg Lab / PHAC (2021)

When opposition MPs demanded unredacted documents explaining the firing of two scientists from Canada's highest-security laboratory, the Public Health Agency of Canada refused — repeatedly. The agency's president, Iain Stewart, declined to comply with multiple orders from a Commons committee and from the House itself. [8]

Speaker Anthony Rota ruled that the government had breached parliamentary privileges. Opposition parties then voted 176–150 to find the government in contempt of Parliament — a formal contempt vote. Stewart was called before the bar of the House of Commons and publicly admonished — the first time a public servant had been subjected to that procedure since 1913. [8] [15]

The government then took the Speaker of the House to Federal Court to block the release of the documents — a step the former House law clerk said was, to his knowledge, unprecedented. [16]

When a special committee of MPs later reviewed the documents, it concluded that the majority of withheld material appeared to be "mostly about protecting the organization from embarrassment for failures in policy and implementation, not legitimate national security concerns." [17]

Episode 4: SDTC / Green Slush Fund (2024)

The Auditor General reported in June 2024 that Sustainable Development Technology Canada had violated its conflict-of-interest policies 90 times, awarded $59 million to 10 ineligible projects, and routinely overstated environmental benefits. [9]

The House passed a motion demanding all SDTC documents be turned over to the Commons law clerk for forwarding to the RCMP. The government did not fully comply by the deadline. The Department of Justice withheld 11,000 pages entirely. Speaker Fergus ruled that the government had not complied with the order, establishing a prima facie breach of parliamentary privilege. [9] [18]

Parliament was unable to move forward on any government legislation for over a week. Capital gains tax votes were rescheduled three times. Bills on First Nations clean drinking water and citizenship rights stalled. [19]

The government's stated defence — that ordering documents produced for handover to the RCMP raised Charter concerns about the separation of Parliament and the judiciary — was a debatable legal argument. But the practical result was the same as in the previous episodes: the documents were not produced as ordered.

V. The Structural Gap: Cabinet Confidence Without Oversight

A thread runs through several of these episodes: the use of cabinet confidence as a shield against disclosure. Under section 69 of the Access to Information Act, cabinet confidences are excluded from the Act entirely. They are not an exemption that the Information Commissioner can review — they are an exclusion that the government self-assesses with no independent verification. [6]

Both Information Commissioners who served during this period called for this to change. Legault's 2017 special report recommended that cabinet confidences be made reviewable by the Commissioner. [4] In March 2026, Maynard specifically lamented the absence of proposals to subject "records deemed to be federal cabinet confidences" to her oversight, and to limit "overly broad exemptions" in the Act. [6]

The question this structural gap raises is not whether any specific document was improperly withheld. It is whether a self-assessed exclusion, applied without independent review, is consistent with a system that was supposed to be "open by default."

VI. The Watchdogs Spoke — Repeatedly

What distinguishes the transparency critique from a partisan talking point is the institutional record. The strongest criticism of the government's transparency performance came not from opposition benches but from the independent Officers of Parliament whose job was to oversee the system.

Commissioner Legault's September 2017 report called Bill C-58 "a regression of existing rights." [4] Her 2016–17 annual report described the Act as "being used as a shield against transparency." [20] In her final days in office in February 2018, she said the government was "sliding into more secrecy." [10]

Commissioner Maynard, who took office in 2018, continued the institutional critique. Her June 2023 annual report stated that she had "observed the steady decline of the access-to-information system to the point where it no longer serves its intended purpose." She noted that "commitments to transparency have vanished from ministerial mandate letters" and said that improving transparency was "not a priority for the government." [5]

In December 2022, she said she was "greatly disappointed" that the government's ATI review report did not include "concrete proposals to address the necessary changes." [21]

The ETHI committee — the House Standing Committee on Access to Information, Privacy and Ethics — conducted its own study and concluded the system still had major flaws. Its 118-page report made 38 recommendations, many echoing what the Commissioners had been calling for. Liberal members filed a dissenting opinion. [22]

The Institute on Governance's 2025 assessment of the Trudeau government's accountability record characterized the overall pattern as one in which "parliamentary business was severely disrupted" by document disputes and the government was "embroiled in several high-profile controversies that raised questions about its commitment to transparency." [23]

VII. The Leadership Change Test

In 2025, Mark Carney replaced Justin Trudeau as Liberal leader and Prime Minister. The party was re-elected on a platform that explicitly positioned Carney as a break from the previous leadership. The question for this article is narrow and specific: has the transparency infrastructure begun to change?

The early signals are not encouraging, though the record is still short.

On March 5, 2026, the Carney government published its ATI reform proposals under the mandatory five-year review. The next day, Information Commissioner Maynard released a public statement. She said the proposals failed to address "the most pressing issue" — unacceptable delays in answering requests. She called the proposals "disappointing" and said they reflected "an insufficient appreciation of the seriousness of the challenges facing Canada's access to information system." [6]

Her specific criticisms were structural. The reform proposals did not address subjecting cabinet confidences to the Commissioner's oversight. They did not limit "overly broad exemptions." They did not establish maximum timelines for consultations. She told Treasury Board President Shafqat Ali that she could not support several of the proposals. [6]

She described the proposals in terms that echo the decade-long pattern: they "appear designed to ease what government institutions perceive as administrative burdens rather than to uphold Canadians' right to know." [6]

Separately, the Parliamentary Budget Officer's position sat vacant from early March 2026 after interim PBO Jason Jacques' six-month term expired. The government nominated Annette Ryan on March 9 and she appeared before the finance committee on March 22–23. But during the gap, the office paused new reports and new parliamentary requests. The OECD had previously flagged "persistent delays" in permanent PBO appointments as a concern affecting perceptions of independence. [24]

These data points do not prove that the Carney government will replicate the Trudeau government's transparency record. The new government has been in office for months, not years, and the PBO nomination is actively proceeding. But the first substantive transparency action — the ATI reform proposals — drew the same structural criticism from the same independent Commissioner that the previous government's actions drew. The pattern has not yet been disrupted.